Will only a Green Power remain a Great Power? Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 144 May 2021. by Dejonghe, Marie
 
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
No. [ ] 
[Date] 
No. 144 
May 2021 
Will Only a Green Power Remain a Great Power? 
Marie Dejonghe 
When the coronavirus broke out in 2020 the 
whole world literally came to a pause. The 
pandemic overshadowed all other major 
problems and started to shape relations 
between states. Climate change suddenly 
disappeared from the international agenda. 
However, the effects of the global climate 
crisis are showing faster and more severely 
than ever before: wildfires in Australia, extreme 
weather events in Asia, tornado’s in America, a 
melting Arctic… Secondary effects like 
climate migration and conflicts have become 
visible as well. This crisis is more urgent than 
ever. 
The COVID-19 crisis has shattered our 
economies, but lockdown measures taken by 
almost all governments have had a positive 
impact on the emission of greenhouse gases. 
The world took a step forward, even if 
unintended, towards the goals set in Paris in 
2015. COVID-19 has taken away a lot from the 
world, but it may also have created a 
momentum to continue this downward trend 
and make it structural. Even the world’s great 
powers will have to integrate the green 
transition in their COVID-19 economy 
recovery plans in order to not fall off the 
wagon. But will only a green great power 
remain a great power?  
 
Climate change is a global crisis and therefore 
cannot be seen in isolation from the current 
multipolar world. Competition will continue to 
define the dynamics between today’s great 
powers: Russia, China, the United States, and the 
European Union. Just because it is a global 
problem, climate change will not be the exception 
on which these great powers work together as 
close partners. Competition will remain, and that 
is not necessarily a bad thing:  if it is well 
regulated, it can have a positive effect on the fast 
development of green technologies and know-
how. If the climate crisis can become the driving 
force behind this competition, we are up for a fast 
development towards a carbon free future. It is 
clear that the climate crisis will have great impact 
on future relations between the great powers. But 
will it lead to a change in the balance of power 
between them? 
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RACING TOWARDS CLIMATE LEADERSHIP? 
The four great powers are all dealing (or not dealing) 
with this global crisis in their own particular way.  
 
China is currently the biggest emitter of all four: it 
accounts for almost 28% of all emissions of 
greenhouse gases in the world.1 China is a relatively 
new active supporter of international climate action. 
Domestically, Beijing started its climate policy as late 
as 2005. Considering its geography, climate, and 
densely populated cities, the effects of climate change 
are emerging rapidly. The Chinese population is 
suffering from extreme air pollution; in order to not 
lose legitimacy and provoke internal instability, the 
CCP was forced to take measures tackling air 
pollution, and thus the climate. This marked the 
beginning of a series of five-year plans in which first 
air pollution and later climate change became a “hot” 
topic.2 Internationally, Beijing held on to the idea of 
“common but differentiated responsibility” until 
2014. It had always argued that, as a developing 
country, it had the right to develop economically 
without severe climate restrictions. After a joint 
announcement with the US in 2014, China sought to 
position itself as a climate advocate, mostly 
rhetorically and diplomatically. The US and China 
thus became key players at the summit in Paris in 
2015, along with the EU: finally a global (though not 
very ambitious) agreement became possible. 3 
 
Furthermore, Xi Jinping has been speaking clear 
climate language, especially after Trump’s withdrawal 
from the Paris Agreement. His message in September 
2020 to make China carbon free by 2060 was precisely 
timed before the US elections in November.4 That 
way he made clear that whoever became president in 
the US, other states could count on Chinese climate 
action. It seems Beijing is embracing the green 
transition, and it has every good reason for it. The shift 
towards a green future may increase China’s energy 
security, could improve China’s economic position, 
and could boost the domestic legitimacy of the CCP 
as well the Chinese reputation internationally. But 
nothing is what it seems. Although Beijing is taking 
ambitious national measures to halt global warming, it 
continues to invest in “brown” projects in its flagship 
foreign project: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
China invests largely in heavy industries, in which coal, 
oil, and gas stay the main sources of energy. Once 
built, it takes a long time to retire from these 
industries. Furthermore, countries who are mostly (or 
almost exclusively) receiving aid from China in the 
form of infrastructure or investment, might become 
more and more dependent on Chinese investment for 
their further development. This way, China indirectly 
shares responsibility for whether these countries meet 
their international climate objectives or not.5 
Moreover, China actively invests in the Arctic region 
to extract energy and to develop transport routes. 
Starting from 2017, China has been “greening” the 
BRI,6 for example through green investments and 
green transport; critics remain sceptical, however. 
Furthermore, the newly announced five-year plan of 
March 2021 shows less ambition than Xi’s rhetoric six 
months before. It is thus still unsure whether Beijing 
is able (or willing) to turn words into deeds.  
 
The EU has been a climate advocate since the start 
of the UNFCCC in 1997.7 Overall, Brussels was one 
of the pioneers for international climate action. The 
EU repeatedly called for a global and legally binding 
climate protocol and aimed for a leading role during 
the climate negotiations in Paris in 2015. 
Unfortunately, the EU could not convince China and 
the US to agree to its ambitious climate plans. The 
bottom-up approach of the Paris Agreement is not 
ambitious at all; for the EU it meant a big step back. 
Within the EU, there is a more or less common 
understanding that climate change is pressing. Climate 
strikes were held in almost all member states, inspired 
by Greta Thunberg, and green parties are gradually 
gaining votes. A rather modest agreement in Paris did 
not stop the EU from striving for an ambitious 
climate policy within its borders. At the end of 2019, 
the Commission of Ursula Von der Leyen announced 
its Green Deal,8 aiming to become carbon free by 
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2050. This deal fits perfectly with the geopolitical 
agenda from Von der Leyen for the EU. A shift 
towards green energy decreases the EU’s dependence 
on the import of fossil fuels, notably from Russia. The 
carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) that 
has been announced, could safeguard the 
competitiveness of European companies and prevent 
carbon leakage.9 The Green Deal has great potential 
to catapult the EU towards the top in the battle against 
climate change.  
 
Yet, however ambitious the deal may be, it misses a 
strong external dimension. The EU’s ambition to 
become carbon free and embrace green and 
renewable energy will have a positive impact on the 
climate, but also a far-reaching impact on the EU’s 
relations with other states. Furthermore, the shift 
towards green energy does not secure complete 
energy independence. The further development of 
green technologies will demand rare earth materials, 
and China currently has a quasi-monopoly on their 
production and export of these materials. The EU will 
need to anticipate on this new dependence to protect 
its autonomy.10 In addition, the CBAM already 
received a lot of criticism from other states because of 
its potential protectionist character. Furthermore, it is 
unclear whether the CBAM will benefit European 
countries if the EU implements it just unilaterally. 
Climate action thus needs internal as well as external 
initiatives, to be effective. If the EU does not integrate 
an external dimension in the Green Deal, instability at 
its borders is lurking, and the climate crisis may not be 
solved rapidly at all.  
 
In the US, the ambition to deal with climate change 
has always depended on party politics. Trump’s 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement was nothing 
new: in 2001 Republican president Bush jr. decided to 
not implement the Kyoto protocol, agreed in 1997. 11  
The partisan views on climate change put a spanner in 
the works of any stable and ambitious climate policy. 
President Obama can be seen as a climate advocate 
because of the Paris Agreement and domestic 
initiatives like his Clean Power Plan.12 But president 
Obama was limited to executive orders rather than 
legislation, due to a reluctant Congress. And even if 
there is a Democratic majority in the Congress, it is 
not certain that even all Democrats would vote in 
favour of an ambitious climate plan. Constantly 
reversing and reintroducing climate change policies 
whenever a new president comes into office, 
decreases the US’s international leverage and hurts its 
reputation as an ambitious climate advocate.  
 
Fortunately, the withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement did not have irreversible consequences, 
because Trump only served one term and individual 
states of the US continued to take climate measures.13  
But on the other hand, the withdrawal prompted 
allied countries to take measures regardless of the US, 
and many have been scarred by their experiences with 
the Trump administration. In the end, the US remains 
a key player in successfully tackling climate change, 
and luckily for the world it is willing to take up its 
responsibility once again. But it remains questionable 
whether Washington will be able to take consistent 
climate action in the future.  
 
In Russia, concrete climate action seems far away. 
Although, according to different scientists, global 
warming is evolving faster and more severely in 
Russia, Moscow has been reluctant to develop an 
ambitious climate policy. Russian policy-makers 
rather point out the “good” side of climate change, 
such as the opportunities for agriculture in Siberia and 
the opening of the northern sea route.14 
Internationally, Russia adopted the Paris Agreement, 
by presidential decree, only in 2019. Russian climate 
objectives are anything but ambitious; they even leave 
some room to increase the emission of greenhouse 
gases. Russia still profits from the drop of emissions 
after the Soviet Union collapsed and currently emits 
around 70% of what it emitted in 1990. 15  Therefore, 
Russia does not have any incentives to take ambitious 
measures.  
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The pretended benefits do not outweigh the 
devastating consequences that global warming will 
have for Russia, directly and indirectly. If all great 
powers but Russia take measures towards a green 
transition, Russia will eventually be left behind. As a 
major exporter, natural gas became part of the 
Russian identity. Due to the transition away from 
fossil fuels, including natural gas, Moscow risks losing 
its most important export markets. This will also 
affect Russia’s external power: its capacity to leverage 
the gas supply whenever a state does not comply with 
its demands, of which the 2008 gas crisis with Ukraine 
was a striking example. Currently, Russian statesmen 
frame the green transition as an instrument to weaken 
Russia, instead of naming the real threat: Russian 
inaction.16 If Russia does not anticipate on this 
transition, it might lose not just economic power but 
even its great power status.  
 
IS THERE A “CLIMATE LEADER”? 
One might ask what the point is of being a climate 
leader, if not all states participate in climate action. In 
any case, there is no actual leader yet. Nonetheless, 
some states are performing better than others. But 
obviously, there is still room for improvement in the 
climate policy of each of the great powers.  
 
Internal division forms a big obstacle for states to act 
appropriately on the climate crisis. Only in China can 
the government take effective domestic measures if it 
so decides, due to its autocratic system as well as the 
genuine demand from the public. With 27 member 
states, the forever EU experiences difficulties in 
finding consensus, and this is not different for climate. 
To add an external dimension to the European Green 
Deal, the EU needs to integrate climate in its foreign 
policy, which requires unanimity. However, climate 
should increasingly shape the EU’s foreign policy; it 
might be the perfect opportunity for the EEAS to 
take responsibility and demonstrate its capacity. This 
may lead to a positive spill-over to other foreign policy 
issues and, eventually, to a deeper integration of the 
EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP).  
The US suffers from internal divisions too. It will 
remain a substantial challenge for president Biden to 
overcome partisan fragmentation. The question is not 
whether Biden will put the US back on the front line 
of climate action, but whether he can convince 
Congress to implement new climate legislation instead 
of a climate policy based only on presidential 
executive orders.17 That would secure a more constant 
and integrated climate policy, and prevent its reversal 
by a next president. During the Earth Day summit 
held by the Biden-administration in April 2021, 
President Biden showed that he was committed to 
cooperate with the US Congress in order to realize his 
ambitious climate plan to cut emissions in half by the 
end of the decade. This is already a step in the right 
direction.  
 
The cards are worse for Russia. With Moscow 
ignoring or even denying global warming, Russia risks 
political and economic marginalisation. Sooner rather 
than later, Moscow will have to start investing in green 
and renewable energy. Fortunately for Russia, the 
global green transition still includes natural gas in the 
short term. Russia thus has some more time to 
formulate a green transition. If it jumped on the green 
train, Russia could switch natural gas for renewable 
energy, for example green hydrogen. Russia has 
expertise and experience producing hydrogen, and 
could make use of its gas infrastructure to export it to 
Europe and other states. Furthermore, Russia 
possesses a big potential of wind, solar and 
hydropower, which are all currently strongly 
underdeveloped. Because the EU will remain a net 
importer of energy in the future, Russia could still be 
one of its suppliers, but now of renewable energy.18  
Letting gas go and embracing the green transition is 
the only way to secure Russia’s international position.  
 
Obviously, climate change cannot be halted by 
domestic action alone. Climate measures can only be 
effective over the long term if they are integrated in 
the wider framework or foreign policy. The EU 
integrated its climate policy in the Green Deal, which 
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is ambitious, but as stated above misses a foreign 
policy dimension. The EU mostly imports energy 
from neighbouring countries, mainly the MENA 
region and Russia. If the EU shifts to renewable 
energy, MENA countries will lose economic and 
geopolitical power, which may cause instability. It is 
important for the EU to actively support these fossil 
fuel-rich countries in their transition to green energy 
to prevent instability at its borders. If the EU can offer 
climate-friendly alternatives, economic regression and 
secondary effects like conflict and migration can be 
avoided. The MENA region has a big potential for 
solar power and, if developed correctly, this could 
form a new export opportunity. 19  Eventually, this will 
lead to a win-win situation for both the EU and 
MENA countries.  
 
Furthermore, the EU imports 40% of its natural gas 
from Russia. If Russia does not participate in the 
development of renewable energy, a power-shift may 
occur. Moscow will lose its leverage over Europe and 
suffer grave economic losses. This could eventually 
harm the credibility of the current regime. A collapse 
of Russia is not completely impossible. This would 
bring instability to the EU’s borders, and might create 
an opportunity for China to increase its power. But 
most notably: it would change the balance of power. 
All of this demands an accurate assessment and 
nuanced strategies on the part of the EU as well as the 
other great powers, if the implosion of Russia is to be 
avoided.  
 
The EU is not the only power introducing big 
projects. Over time, BRI became the flagship project 
of Chinese foreign policy. Beijing gained a lot of 
influence these past years in many countries. Yet, BRI 
is the Achilles’ heel of Chinese climate policy. Beijing 
is taking far-reaching domestic climate measures, but 
continues to invest in fossil fuel projects in the BRI 
countries. In view of great power competition, other 
great powers will be eager to fill this gap that Beijing 
leaves, and offer a green alternative to the BRI 
countries – green energy is the future. In this way, 
China could easily lose influence. The EU should be 
able to fill this gap, and win back influence at its 
borders. 
 
On the other hand, big projects like BRI and the 
Green Deal can offer an opportunity for Beijing and 
Brussels to cooperate. Connecting their strategies will 
bring benefits for the EU and China as well as for 
climate in general. Cooperation on climate change will 
give the EU the opportunity to encourage China to 
play by the same rules, which could eventually result 
in cooperation in other fields. A good starting point 
would be the trade of rare earth materials between 
Brussels and Beijing. There are red lines, however; 
cooperation on climate with China cannot be 
unconditional. If Beijing refuses to cooperate 
according to the agreements made with the EU or 
continues to invest in fossil fuel projects behind the 
curtains, the EU should stand firm and not cooperate. 
Cooperation for cooperation’s sake is a waste of time. 
 
Finally, the climate may eventually become subject to 
the US-China rivalry (if  that is not already the case). 
Rivalry should be understood as actively taking 
measures against one another, while competition is 
just a natural consequence of pursuing the national 
interest. Rivalry is pernicious for climate change, but 
competition is desirable: a green race can speed up the 
development of green technologies. At the same time, 
climate change will only be halted if all states are on 
board. A good balance between competition and 
cooperation is thus required. The US intends to isolate 
climate change from other issues with China and 
cooperate only on climate.20  But it is not that simple. 
China will not just “forget” the rivalry with the US in 
the case of climate, while it goes on in other areas like 
trade and technology. Cooperation on climate can 
form an opportunity for the US to properly manage 
the relations with China and perhaps create positive 
spill-over effects. Cooperation and competition go 
hand in hand; it is better to integrate China rather than 
to exclude it and risk an escalation of rivalry. The EU 
can play an active role in this scenario. If the EU 
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manages to build bridges between China and US, it 
could regain its leverage and position as a climate 
advocate, and maybe become a “leadiator”. 21  The EU 
could then hope to influence US-China relations in its 
favour, safeguard its position on the first row of 
climate action and, not least, ensure a strong and 
global response to climate change. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, it is too soon to already name a climate 
leader. Currently, the power balance between the great 
powers remains more or less the same. However, I 
assume that climate will become a game-changer in 
the future. Climate change can neither be reversed nor 
avoided, and thus it will have a massive impact on all 
great powers. If Russia doesn’t start to develop a green 
energy transition, it will be the first great power to lose 
power. But an implosion of Russia is bad news for 
most states, and must be avoided if possible. On the 
other hand the EU, though facing some obstacles, is 
running its best race until now. If the EU manages to 
redirect its foreign policy towards climate and 
succeeds in mitigating US-China rivalry, the golden 
medal might be waiting. As the old saying goes: where 
two dogs fight over a bone, a third one takes off with 
it…  
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